| Date |
Topic | Lecture Notes | Presenter |
| September 11 | Introduction
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| September 13 | Normal Form Games I Section 3.1, 3.2 |
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| September 18 | Normal Form Games II Section 3.3, 4.1, 4.2 |
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| September 20 | Extensive Form Games and Bayesian Games Section 5.1, 5.2, 6.3 Example of a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (Bargaining Game). |
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| September 25 | Social Choice Chapter 7 Proof of Arrow's Theorem Assignment 1 out |
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| September 27 | Mechanism Design I Chapter 8 Classic Mechanism Design D Parkes |
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| October 2 | Mechanism Design II |
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| October 4 | Auctions Sections 9.1, 9.2 Auctions: An Introduction E Wolfstetter Assignment 1 due Assignment 2 posted |
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| October 9 | Thanksgiving No class |
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| October 11 | Combinatorial Auctions Section 9.3 |
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| October 16 | Repeated Games Section 6.1 |
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| October 18 | Coalitional Games Sections 11.1, 11.2, 11.3 Assignment 2 due Assignment 3 out Code for the assignment is found here |
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| October 23 | Game Representations Graphical models for game theory M. Kearns, M. Littman, and S. Singh Computing Nash equilibria of action-graph games N. Bhat and K. Leyton-Brown A polynomial-time algorithm for action-graph games A. Jiang and K. Leyton-Brown |
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| October 25 | Algorithmic Mechanism Design Algorithmic mechanism design N. Nisan and A. Ronen Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions D. Lehmann, L. O'Callaghan, and Y. Shoham | ||
| October 30 | Auction Designs The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: New fraud in Internet auctions M Yokoo, Y Sakurai and S Matsubara Competitive auctions A. Goldberg, J Hartline, A Karlin, M Saks, and A Wright | ||
| November 1 | Ad Auctions Adwords and generalized online matching A Mehta, A Saberi, U Vazirani, and V Vazirani An analysis of alternative slot auction designs for sponsored search S Lahaie Truthful auctions for pricing search keywords G Aggarwal, A Goel and R Motwani Bonus: News article on Adwords S Robinson Assignment 3 due |
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| November 6 | Selfish Routing How bad is selfish routing? T Roughgarden and E Tardos Braess's paradox in large random graphs G Valiant and T Roughgarden |
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| November 8 | No Class |
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| November 13 | Networks A BGP-based mechanism for lowest-cost routing J Feigenbaum, C Papadimitriou, R Sami and S Shenker Incentive-compatible interdomain routing J Feigenbaum, V Ramachandran and M Schapira Repeated-game modeling of multicast overlays M Afergan and R Sami | ||
| November 15 | Game Playing Aproximating game-theoretic optimal strategies for full scale poker D Billings, N Burch, A Davidson, R Holte, J Schaeffer, T Schauenberg, and D Szafron A competitive Texas Hold'em poker player via automated abstraction and real-time equilibrium computation A Gilpin and T Sandholm | ||
| November 20 | MDP's and MD An MDP-based approach to online mechanism design D Parkes and S Singh Optimal coordinated planning amongst self-interested agents with private state R Cavallo, D Parkes and S Singh Background slides | ||
| November 22 | Automated Mechanism Design/ Empirical Game Theory Methods for empirical game-theoretic analysis M Wellman Empirical mechanism design: Methods,with applications to a supply-chain scenario Y Vorobeychik, C Kiekintveld, and M Wellamn |
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| November 27 | Voting/ Social Choice Ranking Systems: The PageRank axioms A Altman and M Tennenholtz Nonexistence of voting rules that are usually hard to manipulate V Conitzer and T Sandholm |
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| November 29 | Cryptographic Methods Rational secure function evaluation and ideal mechanism design S Izmalkov, M Lepinski, and S Micali Decentralized voting with unconditional privacy F Brandt and T Sandholm | ||
| December 4 | P2P/ Reputation Minimum payments that reward honest reputation feedback R Jurca and B Faltings Analyzing the economic efficiency of eBay-like online reputation mechanisms C Dellarocas |