

# Combinatorial Repairability for Threshold Schemes

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# Repairability

- Suppose some person loses their share in a  $(k, n)$ -threshold scheme
- Want a way to securely reconstruct (or repair) that person's lost share without revealing any additional information about the secret
- This paper presents two repairability schemes:
  1. Enrollment protocol based
  2. Combinatorial

# Secret Sharing Threshold Schemes

→  $(k, n)$ -threshold scheme

- ◆  $k$  and  $n$  are positive integers where  $k \leq n$
- ◆  $k$  is the **threshold**
- ◆  $n$  participants, denoted  $P_1, \dots, P_n$
- ◆ There exists a **dealer** who is some trusted authority that splits some secret value  $K$  into  $n$  **shares**,  $s_1, \dots, s_n$
- ◆ Each share  $s_i$  is distributed to participant  $P_i$  in a secure manner

→ Two properties must hold:

1. The secret can be reconstructed given any  $k$  of the  $n$  shares
2. Any  $k-1$  or fewer shares reveal no information about the secret

# Ramp Schemes

→  $(k_1, k_2, n)$ -ramp scheme

- ◆  $k_1$  is the **lower threshold**
- ◆  $k_2$  is the **upper threshold**
- ◆ When  $k_2 = k_1 + 1 = k$ , a ramp scheme is equivalent to a  $(k, n)$ -threshold scheme

→ Two properties must hold:

1. Any subset of  $k_2$  players can compute the secret from the shares they collectively hold
2. No subset of  $k_1$  players can determine any information about the secret

# Motivation for Ramp Schemes

- Efficiency of secret sharing is often measured in **information rate**
  - ◆ Where  $\mathcal{K}$  is the set of all possible secrets and  $\mathcal{S}$  is the set of all possible shares, information rate  $\rho = \log_2 |\mathcal{K}| / \log_2 |\mathcal{S}|$
  - ◆ This is the ratio of the size of the secret to the size of the share
- A fundamental property of a  $(k, n)$ -threshold scheme is  $|\mathcal{K}| \leq |\mathcal{S}|$ , so  $\rho \leq 1$ 
  - ◆ For a Shamir threshold scheme  $|\mathcal{K}| = |\mathcal{S}|$ , so  $\rho = 1$
  - ◆  $\rho = 1$  is the optimal information rate for a threshold scheme
- Ramp schemes permit larger secrets to be shared for a given share size
  - ◆ For  $(k_1, k_2, n)$ -ramp schemes there are constructions where the optimal information rate  $\rho = k_2 - k_1$
  - ◆  $\rho > 1$  information rate is possible for a non-threshold ramp scheme

# Repairable Schemes

## → Share Repairability

- Repairable Threshold Schemes
- Types of Repairability

## → Two types of schemes

1. Enrollment
2. Combinatorial

# Share Repairability

- A participant  $P_i$  has lost their share  $s_i$
- Goal is to have a secure protocol involving  $P_i$  and a subset of other participants that allows  $s_i$  to be reconstructed
- Two assumptions:
  1. the dealer is no longer present in the scheme after the initial setup
  2. there exist secure pairwise channels linking pairs of players

# Share Repairability

→ A  $(k, n, d)$ -repairable threshold scheme, or  $(k, n, d)$ -RTS, is a protocol that operates in two phases:

1. **Message exchange phase:**

- A certain subset of  $d$  participants (not including  $P_j$ ) exchange messages among themselves
- This integer  $d$  is called the **repairing degree** ( $d \geq k$  is a necessary condition)
- Only protocols where each participant sends at most one message to any other participant and where every message is sent at the same time are considered

2. **Repairing phase:**

- The same  $d$  participants each send a message to  $P_j$ ,
- Messages received by  $P_j$  allow  $s_j$  to be reconstructed



# Types of Repairability

## 1. Universal Repairability

- Any subset of  $d$  participants can repair a share of any other player

## 2. Restricted Repairability

- There exists a subset of  $d$  participants who will be able to repair a given share belonging to some other player
- Potential advantage is that it can lead to more efficient schemes (in terms of info rate and/or communication complexity)
- Potential disadvantage is that some of the  $d$  participants may be unavailable, rendering the repair impossible

# Enrollment Protocol

- Recall the **enrollment protocol** from an earlier talk in this course
  - ◆ Was introduced to create a share for a new participant in a threshold scheme without requiring the dealer who initially set up the scheme

## → Enrollment protocol as a $(k, n, k)$ -RTS

- ◆ Suppose we have a scheme defined over a finite field of order  $Q$ , denoted  $\mathbb{F}_Q$
- ◆ Participants  $P_1, \dots, P_k$  want to reconstruct the share for participant  $P_\ell$  where  $\ell > k$
- ◆ The share for  $P_\ell$  is  $s_\ell = f(\ell)$
- ◆ The share  $s_\ell$  can be expressed as:

$$s_\ell = \sum_{i=1}^k \gamma_i s_i$$

where the  $\gamma_i$ 's are public Lagrange coefficients

# Enrollment Protocol for Repair

The enrollment protocol repair process would proceed as follows:

## Message Exchange Phase

1. For all  $1 \leq i \leq k$ , participant  $P_i$  computes random value  $\delta_{j,i}$  for  $1 \leq j \leq k$  such that

$$\gamma_i s_i = \sum_{j=1}^k \delta_{j,i}$$

2. Then, for all  $i, j$ , participant  $P_i$  transmits  $\delta_{j,i}$  to participant  $P_j$

## Repairing Phase

3. For all  $j$ , participant  $P_j$  transmits  $\sigma_j$  to participant  $P_\ell$ , where

$$\sigma_j = \sum_{i=1}^k \delta_{j,i}$$

4. Finally, the participant  $P_\ell$  computes their share  $s_\ell$  with

$$s_\ell = \sum_{j=1}^k \sigma_j$$

# Things to Note - Enrollment Protocol for Repair

- This protocol achieves universal repairability
  - Any subset of  $d$  participants can repair a share of any other player
- This protocol is secure against coalitions of size  $k - 1$
- This protocol also works in the case of a ramp scheme
  - I.e. protocol works similarly when using a ramp scheme instead of a threshold scheme

# Combinatorial Scheme for Repair

→ Combinatorial repairability method has two components:

## 1. Base Scheme

- An underlying scheme used to give each participant multiple sub shares
- Can use threshold schemes or ramp schemes

## 2. Distribution design

- A combinatorial design which specifies what sub shares are given to a participant
- Can use:
  - Steiner Triple Systems
  - BIBD with  $\lambda = 1$
  - Projective Planes

# Combinatorial Repair Example - (2, 7, 3)-RTS

## Example of a (2, 7, 3)-RTS

### → Distribution design

- ◆ Start with a (7, 3, 1)-BIBD which has seven blocks
- ◆ This design is public
- ◆ Associate a block with each participant:

$$P_1 \leftrightarrow 123$$

$$P_2 \leftrightarrow 145$$

$$P_3 \leftrightarrow 167$$

$$P_4 \leftrightarrow 246$$

$$P_5 \leftrightarrow 257$$

$$P_6 \leftrightarrow 347$$

$$P_7 \leftrightarrow 356$$

### → Base scheme

- ◆ Construct a (5,7)-threshold scheme
- ◆ The shares from the base scheme are  $s_1, s_2, \dots, s_7$

# Combinatorial Repair Example - (2, 7, 3)-RTS

→ Distribution design:

$$P_1 \leftrightarrow 123$$

$$P_2 \leftrightarrow 145$$

$$P_3 \leftrightarrow 167$$

$$P_4 \leftrightarrow 246$$

$$P_5 \leftrightarrow 257$$

$$P_6 \leftrightarrow 347$$

$$P_7 \leftrightarrow 356$$

→ Base scheme:

◆ The shares from a (5,7)-threshold scheme are  $s_1, s_2, \dots, s_7$

→ Each participant gets 3 shares from the base scheme

→ The blocks in the distribution design list the indices of the sub shares from the base scheme held by each participant

→ Expanded Scheme:

$P_1$ 's expanded shares are $s_1, s_2, s_3$	$P_5$ 's expanded shares are $s_2, s_5, s_7$
$P_2$ 's expanded shares are $s_1, s_4, s_5$	$P_6$ 's expanded shares are $s_3, s_4, s_7$
$P_3$ 's expanded shares are $s_1, s_6, s_7$	$P_7$ 's expanded shares are $s_3, s_5, s_6$
$P_4$ 's expanded shares are $s_2, s_4, s_6$	

# Combinatorial Repair Example - (2, 7, 3)-RTS

## → Expanded Scheme:

$P_1$ 's expanded shares are  $s_1, s_2, s_3$        $P_5$ 's expanded shares are  $s_2, s_5, s_7$

$P_2$ 's expanded shares are  $s_1, s_4, s_5$        $P_6$ 's expanded shares are  $s_3, s_4, s_7$

$P_3$ 's expanded shares are  $s_1, s_6, s_7$        $P_7$ 's expanded shares are  $s_3, s_5, s_6$

$P_4$ 's expanded shares are  $s_2, s_4, s_6$

→ The base scheme has a threshold of 5 and the resulting RTS has a threshold of 2

→ Any two blocks contain at least 5 different sub shares

- ◆ So any 2 users can reconstruct the secret since they have at least the threshold number of shares
- ◆ Any 1 user has less than the threshold number of sub shares so they can learn nothing about the secret



# Combinatorial Repair Example - (2, 7, 3)-RTS

$P_1$ 's shares are  $s_1, s_2, s_3$        $P_5$ 's shares are  $s_2, s_5, s_7$

$P_2$ 's shares are  $s_1, s_4, s_5$        $P_6$ 's shares are  $s_3, s_4, s_7$

$P_3$ 's shares are  $s_1, s_6, s_7$        $P_7$ 's shares are  $s_3, s_5, s_6$

$P_4$ 's shares are  $s_2, s_4, s_6$

## → Repairing process:

- ◆ When a participant wants to repair their share they would contact  $d=3$  other participants
- ◆ If  $P_1$  loses their share  $\{s_1, s_2, s_3\}$ 
  - Can contact  $P_2$  to recover their first sub share  $s_1$
  - Can contact  $P_4$  to recover their second sub share  $s_2$
  - Can contact  $P_6$  to recover their third sub share  $s_3$
  - Then their share is recovered

# Things to Note - Combinatorial Repairability

- This protocol achieves restricted repairability
  - I.e. There exists a subset of  $d$  participants who will be able to repair a given share belonging to some other player
  - Paper considers ways to achieve universal repairability
- Not every threshold  $(k, n)$  is possible
  - Reliant on the existence of combinatorial designs that support the threshold
  - Some tricks are possible (Ex. use a subset of blocks)
- Compared to a past scheme (GLF), the combinatorial construction presented improves in terms of information rate and communication complexity

# Conclusion

- Presented two methods for repairing secrets in threshold schemes
- Identified constructions for combinatorial repairable threshold schemes
  - ◆ Suitable base schemes
  - ◆ Combinatorial designs for distribution designs
- Improved information rate and/or communication complexity over previous work in the area (in exchange for restricted repairability)
- Proposed possible ways to achieve universal repairability in the combinatorial repairable threshold schemes they introduced

# References

- Stinson, Douglas R., and Ruizhong Wei. “Combinatorial repairability for threshold schemes.” *Designs, Codes and Cryptography* 86.1 (2018): 195-210.
  
- See also the talks from Douglas R. Stinson:
  - ◆ “Combinatorial techniques for repairing shares in threshold schemes” from *Combinatorics 2018 in Arco, Italy*, June 4, 2018
  
  - ◆ “A Combinatorial Design Method for Repairing Shares in Threshold Schemes” from *Conference on Combinatorics and its Applications In Celebration of Charlie Colbourn’s 65th Birthday in Singapore*, July 16, 2018